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Abstract
Technology designers often strive to design systems that are flexible enough to be
used in a wide range of situations. Software engineers, in particular, are trained to seek
general solutions to problems. General solutions can be used not only to address the
problem at hand, but also to address a wide range of problems that the designers may
not have even anticipated. Sometimes designers wish to provide general solutions, while
encouraging certain uses of their technology and discouraging or precluding others.
They may attempt to influence the use of technology by “hard-wiring” it so that it
only can be used in certain ways, licensing it so that those who use it are legally
obligated to use it in certain ways, issuing guidelines for how it should be used, or
providing resources that make it easier to use the technology as the designers intended
than to use it in any other way.
This paper examines several cases where designers have attempted to influence the
use of technology through one of these mechanisms. Such cases include key recovery
encryption, Pegasus Mail, Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) Guidelines,
Java, Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) Implementation Guide, Apple’s
style guidelines, and Microsoft Foundation Classes. In some of these cases, the designers
sought to influence the use of technology for competitive reasons or in order to promote
standardization or interoperability. However, in other cases designers were motivated
by policy-related goals such as protecting privacy or free speech. As new technologies
are introduced with the express purpose of advancing policy-related goals (for example,
PICS and P3P), it is especially important to understand the roles designers might play
in influencing the use of technology.
1 Introduction
Technology designers often strive to design systems that are flexible enough to be used in
a wide range of situations. Software engineers, in particular, are trained to seek general
solutions to problems. General solutions can be used not only to address the problem at
hand, but also to address a wide range of problems that the designers may not have even
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anticipated. For example, spreadsheet programs often come with templates for computing
interest payments, keeping track of personal finances, and performing other operations that
their designers consider useful. But users can also use these programs to record and analyze
virtually any kind of tabular data. Thus these programs are not limited by the ability of
their designers to anticipate ways that spreadsheets will be used. Indeed, users can and do
invent their own spreadsheet applications.
While general technology solutions allow users to use the technology as they see fit,
users may not always use the technology in desirable ways. Users may use general-purpose
technology tools in ways that are inefficient, dangerous, or contrary to the spirit in which
the technology was designed.
The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Referer field provides an example of the danger
of using technology in an unintended way. HTTP is the protocol used for requesting and
transferring Web pages over the Internet [BLFF96]. The Referer field is an optional HTTP
header that allows Web site operators to track the addresses of Web pages from which visitors
to their site are referred. However, some Web sites use the Referer field for another purpose
for which it was never intended: to verify that forms submitted by visitors have not been
improperly modified. This is a very weak authentication mechanism that can be defeated
easily by forging the Referer field’s contents. Furthermore, as the Referer field is an optional
header, there is no guarantee that Web browsers will transmit it to a Web site. Indeed,
to address a security problem, Microsoft modified the behavior of the Internet Explorer
browser beginning with version 4.0 so that the Referer field is not transmitted under certain
conditions [Mic98]. As a result, some sites that use the Referer field in this unintended way
are finding that users are unable to submit forms at their site. In a column describing this
problem, Lincoln D. Stein concluded, “This painful lesson illustrates why it’s almost never
a good idea to use a feature for other than its intended purpose” [Ste98].
Some unintended usage of technology is neither inefficient nor dangerous, but it nonethe-
less violates the spirit in which the technology was designed. For example, some email
programs are efficient tools for sending out bulk email messages. One such tool, Pegasus
Mail, was developed by programmer David Harris to provide a free service “that enhances
the quality of communication between people” [Har98b]. However, many people have used
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Pegasus mail to send unsolicited commercial email, better known as “spam.” Spam is of-
ten blamed for interfering with interpersonal communication, increasing the time and effort
necessary to retrieve and identify desired email [CL98]. Thus when Pegasus Mail is used for
sending spam it violates the spirit in which this technology was designed.
Sometimes designers wish to provide general solutions, while encouraging certain uses
of their technology and discouraging or precluding others. In this paper we identify four
types of mechanisms used by software engineers (or their employers) to influence the use of
technology. Software engineers may attempt to influence the use of technology by:
• “hard-wiring” it so that it only can be used in certain ways,
• licensing it so that those who use it are legally obligated to use it in certain ways,
• issuing guidelines for how it should be used, or
• providing resources that make it easier to use the technology as the designers intended
than to use it in any other way.
We provide several examples of software systems to which each of these mechanisms has
been applied. In some of these cases, the designers sought to influence the use of technology
for competitive reasons or in order to promote standardization or interoperability. However,
in other cases designers were motivated by policy-related goals such as protecting privacy
or free speech. In some cases, the designers did not actually seek to influence the use of
technology, but their actions had inadvertent influence.
As new technologies are introduced with the express purpose of advancing policy-related
goals (for example, PICS and P3P), it is especially important to understand the roles de-
signers might play in influencing the use of technology.
2 Hard-Wiring
By “hard-wiring” software systems, designers can ensure that software behaves in a certain
way and thus influence how it can be used.
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2.1 Key Recovery Encryption
Key recovery encryption, also sometimes called key escrow encryption or trusted third-party
encryption, is the term for encryption schemes in which the secret encryption keys may be
recovered by certain parties in certain circumstances.
The U.S. government advocates key recovery encryption as providing a balance between
the need on the one hand for individual privacy and legitimate commercial activities, and
on the other hand the need for government eavesdropping for purposes of law enforcement
or national security [MK97]. However, not everyone agrees that these concerns necessarily
conflict, nor that such a balance is best provided by key recovery encryption [AAB+97].
The U.S. government claims any key recovery encryption system will be voluntary to
use [Adm96], and that citizens will be free to use whatever encryption software they wish
(though some also fear that this is merely a stepping stone to disallowing all non-recoverable
encryption systems, as has already been done in countries such as France, Russia, and Indone-
sia). However, the government hopes that key recovery encryption will become widely used
by hard-wiring it into standardized, widely available solutions, such as secure telephones,
Web browsers, and a global public key infrastructure [Dep96]. Furthermore, the government
can further propagate the use of its sanctioned key recovery encryption solutions by allowing
them to be exported freely to other countries, while strong encryption solutions that do not
allow key recovery are currently heavily restricted against export [Dep96].
Indeed, despite industry’s initial opposition to key recovery encryption, several companies
have realized that because of the government’s willingness to provide export licenses for
key recovery encryption and not to routinely provide them for products including non-
recoverable encryption, it may be commercially more viable to support key recovery. To this
end, over 30 companies from around the world have formed the “Key Recovery Alliance”
(KRA) to “promote the implementation, deployment, and use of interoperable key recovery
technologies in the global marketplace.” [Key97]. KRA members include Apple, IBM, Digital
Equipment Corporation, Hewlett-Packard, and Verisign. In addition, other companies, such
as Netscape, have agreed to deploy key recovery encryption in order to obtain export licenses
for their products. As more businesses routinely include key recovery encryption in their
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products, more users will use key recovery encryption even if they are unaware that this is
the case; this is discussed more in Section 5.1.
2.2 Pegasus Mail
In order to prevent users of Pegasus Mail from using it to send spam, Harris might have hard-
wired Pegasus Mail so that it could not be used in this way. However, this would have likely
reduced the program’s utility as a communication tool, making it difficult or impossible for
people to use it to send legitimate bulk email. Harris took a different approach and modified
Pegasus Mail (beginning with version 2.50) so that it automatically inserts “X-Distribution”
headers into all email messages it sends that are distributed to 50 or more recipients. Harris
also distributed instructions for filtering spam identified by the presence of these headers.
Harris explained that this step should reduce “the abuse of Pegasus Mail ... yet it does not
significantly impact on legitimate users of the program” [Har97]. As discussed in 3.1, Harris
also uses licensing to control the use of Pegasus Mail for sending spam.
2.3 PICS Implementations
The Platform for Internet Content Selection (PICS) is a series of specifications developed
by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) to provide a standard platform for rating In-
ternet content. PICS allows anyone to come up with a set of rating criteria—called a rating
system—and use it to rate Web pages. The development of PICS was largely motivated by
a desire to give parents tools they could use to protect their children from harmful online
materials (as an alternative to laws that would prohibit the online distribution of materials
harmful to children). However, PICS was designed to be a more general specification for
content rating that would be useful for a wide variety of applications beyond protecting
children [RM96]. But despite the flexibility of the PICS specifications, most PICS imple-
mentations to date have hard-wired settings that make them ill-suited for many applications
that go beyond protecting children. The Netscape Navigator 4.5 implementation even goes
so far as to hard-wire in two specific PICS rating systems.
Content Advisor—the PICS implementation in the Microsoft Internet Explorer Web
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browser—has a user interface that will read content labels from any PICS rating system, but
can only be configured to select content with numeric ratings less than a specified threshold.
This makes sense for some of the most common PICS ratings systems that rate character-
istics such as ‘nudity’ and ‘violence’ on increasing numeric scales. A parent who wants to
prevent her child from viewing content with a violence rating higher than 3 simply positions
the slider on the Content Advisor interface so that only content with violence rating 3 or
lower is permitted. The interface is hard-wired so that it is impossible to configure it to
accept only content rated as having high levels of nudity or violence (or any other criteria)
or to select ratings in the middle of a range [Cra98a]. It is not clear whether the interface
designers restricted the interface so as to thwart efforts by children to seek out sexual or
violent content, or whether the interface was designed this way for other reasons (or even
arbitrary reasons). However, it has the effect of limiting the ways that Content Advisor can
be used. A likely unintended consequence is that the interface cannot be used to filter out
low quality content using a PICS rating system that assigns numeric ratings that correspond
to quality stars (four stars for high quality content, zero stars for low quality content, etc.).
2.4 Default Settings
Even when they are not “hard-wired” and may even be relatively easy to change, the settings
initially provided by the manufactures are often left untouched by users. Consequently, the
default settings that inevitably accompany most pieces of software often have great influence
on how that software is used. In some cases, designers are cognizant of this and design the
default settings with an eye towards influencing user behavior. In other cases, default settings
are based on somewhat arbitrary decisions, but they may be nonetheless influential. There
is evidence that users rarely change default settings in popular consumer software products.
For example, Netscape reports that 40 percent of the visitors to their Web site come there
because they have not changed their default home page [Sei98].
When designing software that includes features that can be configured in multiple ways,
designers are often faced with a choice of (a) configuring the features with default settings,
(b) leaving the features that require configuration turned off, or (c) leaving features that
6
require configuration unconfigured, but prompting users to configure them before they can
use the software [CR97]. While explicitly configuring features with default settings is an
obvious way to influence software use, leaving features that require configuration turned off
can also be influential as it limits the degree to which those features will likely be used at
all.
3 Licensing
Software may be licensed so that those who use it are legally obligated to use it in certain
ways.
3.1 Pegasus Mail
In addition to hard-wiring Pegasus Mail to insert special headers when the program is used to
send bulk email as described in Section 2.2, Harris also wrote a prohibition against spamming
into the Pegasus Mail license. The Pegasus Mail Terms and Conditions of Use specifically
prohibits using Pegasus Mail for sending email to “more than 50 recipients for the purpose
of advertising a commercial product or service, where the recipient has not explicitly ex-
pressed interest in receiving such advertisements.” The license also prohibits including the
program in a package designed for sending spam or promoting the use of the program for
that purpose [Har98b]. However, Harris speculates that the cost of enforcing this license in
the U.S. legal system would likely be prohibitive for him [Har98a]. Indeed while the threat
that licenses may be enforced may be somewhat effective in deterring unauthorized use, the
ultimate effectiveness of licenses is likely to depend on their ability to be enforced.
3.2 Java
Sun Microsystems’ Java technology is designed to allow software developers to create “write-
once, run-anywhere” code. That is, any code written in Java should run on any computer,
or in any Web browser, that supports Java, without the developer having to know anything
about which computers or browsers the code will be run on. The Java technology license
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carries two major restrictions on its use. The first places restrictions on its use for critical
applications that it may not be suitable for, while the second ensures compatibility among
different Java language based products, thereby maintaining the write-once, run-anywhere
philosophy.
More specifically, the first restriction, found in the Java Developer’s Kit (JDK) on-line
binary code license agreement applies to anyone developing Java applications, and states that
the “software is not designed or licensed for use in on-line control equipment in hazardous
environments such as operation of nuclear facilities, aircraft navigation or control, or direct
life support machines” [Sun97]. While this may be hard to enforce due to the problem of
detection before problems occur, it makes clear Sun’s impunity to lawsuits in the event that
such use of Java results in damages.
The second restriction is only required for a commercial source license, needed if the user
intends to merge the Java source code into a commercial product, such as a commercial Web
browser that supports the Java interpreter and class libraries. The commercial source code
license is devoted to ensuring cross-platform Java compatibility. Compatibility requirements
are ensured partly by restrictions on the kinds of changes that can be made to the underlying
Java technology components provided by Sun, and are tested through a detailed series of
“test suites.” For example, the commercial source license between Sun and Microsoft includes
the following [SM96]:
Licensee agrees that upon . . . (a) six (6) months after the date that SUN
delivers to Licensee an Upgrade that SUN designates a significant Upgrade (each,
a “Significant Upgrade”), . . . Licensee shall deliver to SUN . . . an upgrade to
the Java Reference Implementation (each, a “Compatible Implementation”) that
passes the test suite that accompanied the Significant upgrade (a “Relevant Test
Suite”). . .
Licensee shall confine the names of all VAOPs [Value Added Open Packages]
to names beginning with “COM.ms” and shall not modify or extend the names of
public class or interface declarations whose names begin with “java”, “COM.sun”
or their equivalents. . .
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Licensee agrees that the Reference Implementation VM [Virtual Machine],
and any upgrades thereto, shall include the necessary Source Code to implement
the functionality of the Java Runtime Interpreter. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
Licensee may implement a subset of the functionality. . . callable by a system-level
interface (a “System Implementation”). In such cases, Licensee shall provide SUN
a complete and accurate specification for all such system-level interfaces. . .
Licensee agrees that the Reference Implementation Java Classes shall be main-
tained as an application level library.
The license also says that any Java classes added by the licensee to the existing set of Java
classes should be made promptly available to developers and customers free of charge, and
that for any “Portable Value Added Open Packages,” either the source code or a complete and
accurate specification including an appropriate test suite must be made publicly available.
Because Sun views cross-platform compatibility as a fundamentally important aspect of
Java, it has been aggressive about enforcing such requirements. Indeed, Sun sued Microsoft
in October of 1997 for alleged breaches of their license in Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 4.0
resulting in incompatibilities with the Java standard. At the time of this writing, the suit
still continues, with hearings scheduled in September 1998.
3.3 PICS
Licensing has been considered and rejected for some technologies due in part to the difficulty
of defining the scope of a license and following up with enforcement. For example, PICS
was intended to be an alternative to legislative proposals that would ban or restrict certain
kinds of content; PICS was designed to be a voluntary system that would let parents decide
for themselves what content is appropriate for their children [RM96]. However, PICS drew
criticism from free speech advocates who were concerned that one or two PICS rating systems
could become de facto standards and eventually become subject to legislation requiring their
use [Ame97]. In response to frequent questions about why the PICS designers had not
licensed PICS so as to preclude its being used in ways that might be harmful to free speech,
one of the PICS designers responded that at the time PICS was developed licensing was
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viewed as infeasible because it would “undercut the ‘neutrality’ and appeal of the technology”
and because “the W3C then would have had to be in the position of determining who should
and should not use it; this is not a role the W3C is competent to play” [Res98].
4 Guidelines
Designers sometimes issue guidelines about how software or systems should be used. Guide-
lines do not limit the ability of technology to be used in unexpected ways, but they can
provide guidance as to the way technology should be used. Guidelines can also be issued
after software is released and they can be updated as people gain experience using a tech-
nology.
While guidelines can make explicit the intention of designers and provide guidance to
those who care to take advantage of them, they are not requirements, and they often can be
overlooked or ignored. The impact of guidelines may be increased by logo or seal programs
that provide a logo or seal of approval that products following a particular set of guidelines
are allowed to display. However, these programs generally require an arbiter to determine
which products are entitled to display the logo, and permission to display the logo may be
tied to a licensing agreement.
There may also be a risk that users (as well as implementors) may confuse guidelines with
requirements, and come to expect that products follow published guidelines. Thus users
may develop false expectations about products, or implementors may build interoperable
products that interoperate only with products following a particular set of guidelines. On
the other hand, if users or some implementors treat guidelines as requirements, it may put
more pressure on other implementors to follow the guidelines.
4.1 PICS
Over two years after PICS was developed, the PICS designers issued a “Statement on the
Intent and Use of PICS: Using PICS Well.” This document includes a set of guidelines that
address how the designers intended PICS to be used [RW98]. It’s not clear that PICS had
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actually been used in an undesirable way, but criticism that PICS had been designed such
that it could be used in undesirable ways (especially from a first amendment standpoint)
likely prompted the PICS designers to issue this statement [Ame97, Cra98a].
4.2 P3P
Another W3C specification, the Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [RC98],
developed guidelines in parallel with the specification itself. Motivated by both the response
to PICS and a perceived need to provide guidance on issues outside the scope of the P3P
specification (such as user interface), the P3P designers began developing an implementation
guide. One section of the guide, the P3P Guiding Principles [Cra98b], provides a set of
guidelines for the way P3P should be implemented and used. These guidelines emphasize
that P3P was designed as a privacy protection tool and advise implementors to make design
decisions that support the goals of P3P. However, the document notes that the guidelines
are recommendations rather than requirements.
4.3 Apple Style Guidelines
Apple Computers has a deeply thought-out philosophy behind the design of its computers
and their software, reflected in almost every detail, from the use of color to the placement of
menus. In order to help ensure a “look and feel” consistent with this philosophy across all
software applications that run on the Macintosh, Apple Computers has provided an extensive
list of “style guidelines” to be used by developers of software applications for the Macintosh.
Specifically, their 400-page bookMacintosh Human Interface Guidelines [App92b] “describes
the way to create products that optimize the interactions between people and Macintosh
computers. It explains the whys and hows of the Macintosh interface in general terms
and specific details.” [App92b]. This book is comprehensive and easy-to-read, with lots of
examples of “good” and “bad” software development for the Macintosh; it is available both
for free in electronic format from the Apple Web site, and in print from conventional book-
sellers. In addition, other style guidelines documents such as “Control Layout Guidelines,”
“Guidelines for Content Manipulation,” and “Application Layout Guidelines” are available
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electronically from their Web site. In making such information available and readable, Apple
has made it much easier for developers to consistently design products that fit the Macintosh
model and philosophy, and many developers have indeed done so. The guidelines are also
supported by a toolkit designed to help developers follow the guidelines; this is discussed
below in Section 5.2.
5 Toolkits and other Resources
Often, the designers of software and computer systems provide resources that make it easier
to use the technology as the designers intended than to use it in any other way. Such
resources can be in the form of toolkits, published interface specifications, or even simply by
making certain off-the-shelf solutions widely available.
5.1 Key Recovery Encryption
As an example of influencing usage via off-the-shelf availability, the U.S. government may
succeed in its goal of making most encryption that people use recoverable simply by getting
most commercial software developers to include it hard-wired in their systems as discussed
in Section 2.1. Similarly, if a global public key infrastructure using key recovery is put into
place, the comparative ease of using it rather than having to do encryption without the
benefit of a public key infrastructure may go a long way towards making most encrypted
traffic recoverable.
On the other hand, people who don’t like key recovery can try to combat this by making
widely available non-recoverable encryption solutions. For example, until its recent acqui-
sition by Network Associates, the PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) encryption system [Zim95]
specifically did not allow key recovery, was freely available on the Internet for personal, non-
commercial use, and built up a “grass-roots” public key infrastructure in which individual
users certify each other’s public keys. PGP’s creator, Phil Zimmerman, also used PGP as a
staging ground for debates on individuals’ rights to privacy, cryptography export regulations,
and certain patentability issues.
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5.2 Apple Style Guidelines
As described in Section 4.3, Apple has extensive guidelines describing what it considers to
be good software development practices for the Macintosh. To further encourage developers
to follow their guidelines, they also provide a toolkit of Macintosh system software routines
that follow the guidelines and can be used by developers in their Macintosh software appli-
cations [App92a]. Since it is often easier to use the toolkit routines than to write similar
routines from scratch, this results in different developers using the same toolkit routines,
thereby creating a more consistent and standard interface to be presented to the user even
when using software from different developers.
5.3 Microsoft Foundation Classes
The Microsoft Foundation Class Library (MFC) is a software library consisting of a “set of
reusable, pre-built C++ components that provide a completely portable interface for appli-
cations for the Microsoft Windows, Windows 95, and Windows NT operating systems,” as
well as some Macintosh and Unix platforms [Mic95]. Its main goal is to allow developers
to write applications for Windows much faster than writing them from scratch. This is an
important marketing feature for Microsoft because it results in more Windows applications
being available even as new versions of Windows are constantly evolving. Although the MFC
to some extent results in a similar look and feel across different applications, this does not
appear to have been as important a consideration for Microsoft as it was for Apple (see
Sections 4.3 and 5.2). Instead, they have chosen to make the MFC quite general to allow
developers to have more flexibility even though this tends to result in a more diverse look
and feel across different applications.
In addition to the MFC itself, Microsoft has also provided a set of guidelines for de-
velopers who want to extend the MFC in a way that will interact well with existing MFC
components [Mic97].
13
6 Conclusions
We have discussed four different types of methods that software engineers may use to attempt
to influence the way their technology is used. We have provided a variety of examples of
how these techniques have been used, with varying degrees of success. From our analysis,
there is no one method that emerges as most successful.
• Hard-wiring certainly is effective in limiting the use of a particular tool, but it may
prove overly limiting, precluding many desirable (and possibly unforeseeable) uses of
that tool. Furthermore, there may be alternative tools, possibly from competing ven-
dors, readily available to those who are determined to use the technology in ways that
designers are attempting to influence against.
• Licensing can be effective when licenses are readily enforceable. However, enforcing
licenses can be expensive and time-consuming, both due to the difficulty of monitor-
ing licensees to determine when licenses are not being enforced, and due to the legal
expenses involved in pursuing a case against a misbehaving licensee. While the threat
of enforcement may be somewhat of a deterrent, undesirable use is not actually pre-
cluded, although it may sometimes be punished after it occurs. Licensing can also be
useful to limit the liability that a software developer has if their technology is used in
unapproved ways; this may exert further influence on users to follow approved usage.
• Guidelines have the advantages that they do not limit unexpected uses, and they
can be updated as people gain experience with a new technology. However, they
neither preclude nor punish undesirable use. Logo programs and pressure from users
or implementors may encourage voluntary compliance.
• Toolkits and other resources can make it much easier for people to use technology as
intended than to use it in other ways that will require them to build the necessary
resources themselves. However, when people feel strongly about using technology in
ways not supported by the toolkit or other available resources, they can and will develop
their own resources that result in uses that designers are trying to influence against.
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Designers who wish to influence software usage would be wise to consider the tradeoffs
of each of these methods when determining what approach to take in a particular situation.
However, designers should also keep in mind that while these methods can be useful in per-
suading users who are choosing between multiple alternatives they consider acceptable, these
methods are unlikely to persuade users to choose alternatives to which they are opposed.
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